There's never been a US CVBG* forward deployed or deployed to the Black
Sea, based on acceptance of interpretations of the Montreux Convention
(see, "capital ship," "tonnage," "aircraft carrier," "Black Sea vs.
Non-Black-Sea Power," etc.), as well as the fact that it would be neither
a fun nor a useful place for a non-Russian carrier to be, which is why
we've never tried to challenge the interpretation (except, perhaps, to
keep theirs stuck inside). The only carriers in there are ones that are
built there, and then the Soviets/Russians have to re-classify them to get
them out.
The real problem is when the Navy lost medium attack aviation. It is only
sheer dumb luck that precision ordnance reached the effectiveness it did
when all we had left were Hornets.
*I retain the term from the "almost 600-ship" heyday.
> Which speaks back to the traditional (until recently..) question asked by
> US leaders...âwhere are the carrierâs..?â
> Why a Group isnât forward deployed to the Black Sea, particularly given
> the Georgia history lesson, says more about the current state of
> âWestern Willâ, as lead by the US, than any other action.
>
> The challenges of such a âforwardâ deployment are huge, as is the
> risk, but the consequences of action against the Group, even more so. An
> interesting gaming model, Iâm thinking...
>
> From: Tim O'Reilly
> Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2014 4:14 PM
> To:
> Subject: Re: [Traveller_TNE] Ukraine
>
>
>
> the Abrams/Bradley/Apache are effective yes, but they have to have some
> things going for them which I think no longer exist from before the 1989
> demolishing of the Wall.
> First, they are not on the ground in force there is no longer a REFORGER
> possibility with pre-positioned stocks and vehicles.
> Second builds from that - the ability to deploy the vehicles, troops,
> munitions, etc. is now at least as vulnerable as it was then, and perhaps
> more so. Russian subs and long range bombers would have field days with
> little/no opposition from us. Yes our subs are capable, but finite and I
> expect Russian hunter-killers to make some inroads on us. It'd be worse
> for the USAF and Navy Air as they'd be stretched to the limit on range and
> you-name it. Much as it pains me, we do not have front line aircraft. If
> the Russians have built up their what is it now 5th generation(?) fighter
> fleet, we'd be in a world of hurt.
> The political situation, third, makes me even more cautious. More than
> the apparent incompetence of BHO, its the leaked conversation he had with
> Putin back before the last election where he reportedly said something
> along the lines of, "Not yet, I have to win the next election first..."
> If it is true that amateurs study tactics and professionals study
> logistics, can something be said about politicians taking/studying the
> long view? Americans in particular have a very short attention span both
> for history, and for the future. So, what are or what have we been
> missing? (Thinking back to August 2008 and the very short war between
> Georgia and Russia - what is the bear after this time?)
> Tim
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:04 PM, ""
> <> wrote:
>
>
> Where Striker II and Command Decision "fail" is that they are all about
> detailed equipment-centric ground engagements with air as abstract
> supporting events, rather than air and ground operating together in a
> continuous tissue. In other words, they are a game about a different
> level
> of examination. A game that captured the whole operational tissue would
> not be about detailed vehicle design and performance.
>
> A few days ago when I first heard a report on Ukraine mention, "ethnic
> Russians," my mind immediately flashed to a National Lampoon comic strip
> from 1979/80. It's a picture of the Kremlin with the phone ringing, and
> then word bubbles: "What the? It's Afghanistan calling, and they need
> our
> help!" Deja vu all over again, this time with a warm-water port directly
> involved, instead of just domino-wise.
>
> > With a decade of tanking, and knowing the T90 derived from the
> "quantity"
> > T62-T72 lineage ad opposed to the "quality" lineage of T64 - T80 which
> > died
> > out due to economic reasons, I think US armor would annihilate
> Russians,
> > even without complete combined arms supremacy (which I would also
> expect).
> >
> > Of course, before the Abrams/Bradley/Apache were fielded, I would have
> > given the edge to Warsaw Pact in retrospect, particularly in a Fulda
> Gap
> > scenario, though NATO should have maintained naval and air dominance
> to
> > make it really interesting. Do you think Striker II models pretty
> > decently?
> >
> > Paranoid Soviet logistics would stink almost as bad Western political
> > backbone, though so interesting to see which side would throw away
> their
> > advantage first, but most war games don't assume political/strategic
> > ineptitude.
> >
> > As far as Ukraine, it echoes said political ineptitude more than
> anything
> > from my perspective.
> >
> > - Sent from my SM-N900T
> > On Mar 2, 2014 2:36 PM, <> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Because of the way that TNE was always related to Twilight:2000,
> >> indirectly through 2300, the one-time "New Traveller," as well as
> >> directly
> >> through the "House Rules," not to mention that we were doing them at
> the
> >> same time, I can't help looking at the current Ukraine situation as a
> >> possible point of departure for the Twilight War for someone who
> wanted
> >> to
> >> graft it onto more recent history. Obviously not as directly relevant
> as
> >> the Yeltsin moment Frank chose for T2KV2.2, but similar enough that
> it
> >> reminds me of it. This one would have to be dressed and fluffed up a
> lot
> >> more, and would never approach the Reagan-era zeitgeist of original
> T2K,
> >> but it is the first thing in a while that has even reminded me of
> T2K.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>
>
>
>
>
>
Sea, based on acceptance of interpretations of the Montreux Convention
(see, "capital ship," "tonnage," "aircraft carrier," "Black Sea vs.
Non-Black-Sea Power," etc.), as well as the fact that it would be neither
a fun nor a useful place for a non-Russian carrier to be, which is why
we've never tried to challenge the interpretation (except, perhaps, to
keep theirs stuck inside). The only carriers in there are ones that are
built there, and then the Soviets/Russians have to re-classify them to get
them out.
The real problem is when the Navy lost medium attack aviation. It is only
sheer dumb luck that precision ordnance reached the effectiveness it did
when all we had left were Hornets.
*I retain the term from the "almost 600-ship" heyday.
> Which speaks back to the traditional (until recently..) question asked by
> US leaders...âwhere are the carrierâs..?â
> Why a Group isnât forward deployed to the Black Sea, particularly given
> the Georgia history lesson, says more about the current state of
> âWestern Willâ, as lead by the US, than any other action.
>
> The challenges of such a âforwardâ deployment are huge, as is the
> risk, but the consequences of action against the Group, even more so. An
> interesting gaming model, Iâm thinking...
>
> From: Tim O'Reilly
> Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2014 4:14 PM
> To:
> Subject: Re: [Traveller_TNE] Ukraine
>
>
>
> the Abrams/Bradley/Apache are effective yes, but they have to have some
> things going for them which I think no longer exist from before the 1989
> demolishing of the Wall.
> First, they are not on the ground in force there is no longer a REFORGER
> possibility with pre-positioned stocks and vehicles.
> Second builds from that - the ability to deploy the vehicles, troops,
> munitions, etc. is now at least as vulnerable as it was then, and perhaps
> more so. Russian subs and long range bombers would have field days with
> little/no opposition from us. Yes our subs are capable, but finite and I
> expect Russian hunter-killers to make some inroads on us. It'd be worse
> for the USAF and Navy Air as they'd be stretched to the limit on range and
> you-name it. Much as it pains me, we do not have front line aircraft. If
> the Russians have built up their what is it now 5th generation(?) fighter
> fleet, we'd be in a world of hurt.
> The political situation, third, makes me even more cautious. More than
> the apparent incompetence of BHO, its the leaked conversation he had with
> Putin back before the last election where he reportedly said something
> along the lines of, "Not yet, I have to win the next election first..."
> If it is true that amateurs study tactics and professionals study
> logistics, can something be said about politicians taking/studying the
> long view? Americans in particular have a very short attention span both
> for history, and for the future. So, what are or what have we been
> missing? (Thinking back to August 2008 and the very short war between
> Georgia and Russia - what is the bear after this time?)
> Tim
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:04 PM, ""
> <> wrote:
>
>
> Where Striker II and Command Decision "fail" is that they are all about
> detailed equipment-centric ground engagements with air as abstract
> supporting events, rather than air and ground operating together in a
> continuous tissue. In other words, they are a game about a different
> level
> of examination. A game that captured the whole operational tissue would
> not be about detailed vehicle design and performance.
>
> A few days ago when I first heard a report on Ukraine mention, "ethnic
> Russians," my mind immediately flashed to a National Lampoon comic strip
> from 1979/80. It's a picture of the Kremlin with the phone ringing, and
> then word bubbles: "What the? It's Afghanistan calling, and they need
> our
> help!" Deja vu all over again, this time with a warm-water port directly
> involved, instead of just domino-wise.
>
> > With a decade of tanking, and knowing the T90 derived from the
> "quantity"
> > T62-T72 lineage ad opposed to the "quality" lineage of T64 - T80 which
> > died
> > out due to economic reasons, I think US armor would annihilate
> Russians,
> > even without complete combined arms supremacy (which I would also
> expect).
> >
> > Of course, before the Abrams/Bradley/Apache were fielded, I would have
> > given the edge to Warsaw Pact in retrospect, particularly in a Fulda
> Gap
> > scenario, though NATO should have maintained naval and air dominance
> to
> > make it really interesting. Do you think Striker II models pretty
> > decently?
> >
> > Paranoid Soviet logistics would stink almost as bad Western political
> > backbone, though so interesting to see which side would throw away
> their
> > advantage first, but most war games don't assume political/strategic
> > ineptitude.
> >
> > As far as Ukraine, it echoes said political ineptitude more than
> anything
> > from my perspective.
> >
> > - Sent from my SM-N900T
> > On Mar 2, 2014 2:36 PM, <> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Because of the way that TNE was always related to Twilight:2000,
> >> indirectly through 2300, the one-time "New Traveller," as well as
> >> directly
> >> through the "House Rules," not to mention that we were doing them at
> the
> >> same time, I can't help looking at the current Ukraine situation as a
> >> possible point of departure for the Twilight War for someone who
> wanted
> >> to
> >> graft it onto more recent history. Obviously not as directly relevant
> as
> >> the Yeltsin moment Frank chose for T2KV2.2, but similar enough that
> it
> >> reminds me of it. This one would have to be dressed and fluffed up a
> lot
> >> more, and would never approach the Reagan-era zeitgeist of original
> T2K,
> >> but it is the first thing in a while that has even reminded me of
> T2K.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>
>
>
>
>
>