Which speaks back to the traditional (until recently..) question asked by US leaders...âwhere are the carrierâs..?â
Why a Group isnât forward deployed to the Black Sea, particularly given the Georgia history lesson, says more about the current state of âWestern Willâ, as lead by the US, than any other action.
The challenges of such a âforwardâ deployment are huge, as is the risk, but the consequences of action against the Group, even more so. An interesting gaming model, Iâm thinking...
From: Tim O'Reilly
Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2014 4:14 PM
To:
Subject: Re: [Traveller_TNE] Ukraine
the Abrams/Bradley/Apache are effective yes, but they have to have some things going for them which I think no longer exist from before the 1989 demolishing of the Wall.
First, they are not on the ground in force there is no longer a REFORGER possibility with pre-positioned stocks and vehicles.
Second builds from that - the ability to deploy the vehicles, troops, munitions, etc. is now at least as vulnerable as it was then, and perhaps more so. Russian subs and long range bombers would have field days with little/no opposition from us. Yes our subs are capable, but finite and I expect Russian hunter-killers to make some inroads on us. It'd be worse for the USAF and Navy Air as they'd be stretched to the limit on range and you-name it. Much as it pains me, we do not have front line aircraft. If the Russians have built up their what is it now 5th generation(?) fighter fleet, we'd be in a world of hurt.
The political situation, third, makes me even more cautious. More than the apparent incompetence of BHO, its the leaked conversation he had with Putin back before the last election where he reportedly said something along the lines of, "Not yet, I have to win the next election first..."
If it is true that amateurs study tactics and professionals study logistics, can something be said about politicians taking/studying the long view? Americans in particular have a very short attention span both for history, and for the future. So, what are or what have we been missing? (Thinking back to August 2008 and the very short war between Georgia and Russia - what is the bear after this time?)
Tim
On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:04 PM, "" <> wrote:
Where Striker II and Command Decision "fail" is that they are all about
detailed equipment-centric ground engagements with air as abstract
supporting events, rather than air and ground operating together in a
continuous tissue. In other words, they are a game about a different level
of examination. A game that captured the whole operational tissue would
not be about detailed vehicle design and performance.
A few days ago when I first heard a report on Ukraine mention, "ethnic
Russians," my mind immediately flashed to a National Lampoon comic strip
from 1979/80. It's a picture of the Kremlin with the phone ringing, and
then word bubbles: "What the? It's Afghanistan calling, and they need our
help!" Deja vu all over again, this time with a warm-water port directly
involved, instead of just domino-wise.
> With a decade of tanking, and knowing the T90 derived from the "quantity"
> T62-T72 lineage ad opposed to the "quality" lineage of T64 - T80 which
> died
> out due to economic reasons, I think US armor would annihilate Russians,
> even without complete combined arms supremacy (which I would also expect).
>
> Of course, before the Abrams/Bradley/Apache were fielded, I would have
> given the edge to Warsaw Pact in retrospect, particularly in a Fulda Gap
> scenario, though NATO should have maintained naval and air dominance to
> make it really interesting. Do you think Striker II models pretty
> decently?
>
> Paranoid Soviet logistics would stink almost as bad Western political
> backbone, though so interesting to see which side would throw away their
> advantage first, but most war games don't assume political/strategic
> ineptitude.
>
> As far as Ukraine, it echoes said political ineptitude more than anything
> from my perspective.
>
> - Sent from my SM-N900T
> On Mar 2, 2014 2:36 PM, <> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Because of the way that TNE was always related to Twilight:2000,
>> indirectly through 2300, the one-time "New Traveller," as well as
>> directly
>> through the "House Rules," not to mention that we were doing them at the
>> same time, I can't help looking at the current Ukraine situation as a
>> possible point of departure for the Twilight War for someone who wanted
>> to
>> graft it onto more recent history. Obviously not as directly relevant as
>> the Yeltsin moment Frank chose for T2KV2.2, but similar enough that it
>> reminds me of it. This one would have to be dressed and fluffed up a lot
>> more, and would never approach the Reagan-era zeitgeist of original T2K,
>> but it is the first thing in a while that has even reminded me of T2K.
>>
>>
>>
>
Why a Group isnât forward deployed to the Black Sea, particularly given the Georgia history lesson, says more about the current state of âWestern Willâ, as lead by the US, than any other action.
The challenges of such a âforwardâ deployment are huge, as is the risk, but the consequences of action against the Group, even more so. An interesting gaming model, Iâm thinking...
From: Tim O'Reilly
Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2014 4:14 PM
To:
Subject: Re: [Traveller_TNE] Ukraine
the Abrams/Bradley/Apache are effective yes, but they have to have some things going for them which I think no longer exist from before the 1989 demolishing of the Wall.
First, they are not on the ground in force there is no longer a REFORGER possibility with pre-positioned stocks and vehicles.
Second builds from that - the ability to deploy the vehicles, troops, munitions, etc. is now at least as vulnerable as it was then, and perhaps more so. Russian subs and long range bombers would have field days with little/no opposition from us. Yes our subs are capable, but finite and I expect Russian hunter-killers to make some inroads on us. It'd be worse for the USAF and Navy Air as they'd be stretched to the limit on range and you-name it. Much as it pains me, we do not have front line aircraft. If the Russians have built up their what is it now 5th generation(?) fighter fleet, we'd be in a world of hurt.
The political situation, third, makes me even more cautious. More than the apparent incompetence of BHO, its the leaked conversation he had with Putin back before the last election where he reportedly said something along the lines of, "Not yet, I have to win the next election first..."
If it is true that amateurs study tactics and professionals study logistics, can something be said about politicians taking/studying the long view? Americans in particular have a very short attention span both for history, and for the future. So, what are or what have we been missing? (Thinking back to August 2008 and the very short war between Georgia and Russia - what is the bear after this time?)
Tim
On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:04 PM, "" <> wrote:
Where Striker II and Command Decision "fail" is that they are all about
detailed equipment-centric ground engagements with air as abstract
supporting events, rather than air and ground operating together in a
continuous tissue. In other words, they are a game about a different level
of examination. A game that captured the whole operational tissue would
not be about detailed vehicle design and performance.
A few days ago when I first heard a report on Ukraine mention, "ethnic
Russians," my mind immediately flashed to a National Lampoon comic strip
from 1979/80. It's a picture of the Kremlin with the phone ringing, and
then word bubbles: "What the? It's Afghanistan calling, and they need our
help!" Deja vu all over again, this time with a warm-water port directly
involved, instead of just domino-wise.
> With a decade of tanking, and knowing the T90 derived from the "quantity"
> T62-T72 lineage ad opposed to the "quality" lineage of T64 - T80 which
> died
> out due to economic reasons, I think US armor would annihilate Russians,
> even without complete combined arms supremacy (which I would also expect).
>
> Of course, before the Abrams/Bradley/Apache were fielded, I would have
> given the edge to Warsaw Pact in retrospect, particularly in a Fulda Gap
> scenario, though NATO should have maintained naval and air dominance to
> make it really interesting. Do you think Striker II models pretty
> decently?
>
> Paranoid Soviet logistics would stink almost as bad Western political
> backbone, though so interesting to see which side would throw away their
> advantage first, but most war games don't assume political/strategic
> ineptitude.
>
> As far as Ukraine, it echoes said political ineptitude more than anything
> from my perspective.
>
> - Sent from my SM-N900T
> On Mar 2, 2014 2:36 PM, <> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Because of the way that TNE was always related to Twilight:2000,
>> indirectly through 2300, the one-time "New Traveller," as well as
>> directly
>> through the "House Rules," not to mention that we were doing them at the
>> same time, I can't help looking at the current Ukraine situation as a
>> possible point of departure for the Twilight War for someone who wanted
>> to
>> graft it onto more recent history. Obviously not as directly relevant as
>> the Yeltsin moment Frank chose for T2KV2.2, but similar enough that it
>> reminds me of it. This one would have to be dressed and fluffed up a lot
>> more, and would never approach the Reagan-era zeitgeist of original T2K,
>> but it is the first thing in a while that has even reminded me of T2K.
>>
>>
>>
>